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The Lome Peace Accords were signed in July 1999,ending nine years of internal armed conflict betweenthe government forces of Sierra Leone and the Rev-
olutionary United Front (RUF), an armed rebel group
known for committing gross human rights violations. The
conflict in Sierra Leone was one of the most brutal in Africa
because of the nature and extent of war crimes committed
by both sides and the forced recruitment of approximately
five thousand child combatants. The United Nations and
international human rights organizations reported that RUF
combatants adopted a systematic practice of raiding villages,
abducting children from their homes, and using them as com-
batants against their will. According to Amnesty Interna-
tional (AI), personal accounts by former child soldiers reveal
that the RUF threatened children’s lives as well as their fam-
ilies’ lives if the children refused to join the RUF. After the
children were forcibly recruited, they were drugged and
indoctrinated into the systematic practice of killing, raping,
and maiming their victims.
The internal armed conflict in Sierra Leone began in
March 1991, when the RUF launched an attack to over-
throw the government and gain political control of the
country. Fighting between the RUF and government forces
persisted, despite several UN-brokered attempts at peace in
February 1995, November 1996, and October 1997. The
parties ultimately reached an agreement to end hostilities in
July 1999. Now that the internal armed conflict has offi-
cially ended, Sierra Leone is obligated under international
law to prosecute and punish perpetrators of war crimes.
The fact that both government forces and the RUF recruited
children under the age of fifteen to participate in the armed
conflict is a violation of international humanitarian law,
while the acts committed primarily by RUF combatants dur-
ing the hostilities are punishable crimes under international
law. The combination of these elements poses a unique
problem of establishing the accountability of child combat-
ants who were both victims and victimizers in the hostilities.
Obligations to Prosecute
Obligations under the Lome Peace Accords
The Lome Peace Accords marked an official cease-fire
between warring parties, provided for demobilization and dis-
armament of all combatants, and called on the parties to form
a government of national unity, thereby transforming the
RUF into a political party. Since 1999, demobilization of the
thirty percent of minors under the age of eighteen who
make up the RUF forces has been slow. In January 2000, only
about 1,700 of an estimated 5,000 child combatants were dis-
armed and returned to their homes or rehabilitation centers
to undergo special psychological and reintegration treat-
ment. RUF commanders in particular lack the political will
to implement the demobilization duty established in the
Lome Peace Accords. In fact, they continue to employ child
combatants to secure their control of politically contested dia-
mond fields in the eastern region of the country, and have
been recapturing demobilized child combatants from reha-
bilitation centers.
The Lome Peace Accords also called for the establishment
of a truth and reconciliation commission as an essential ele-
ment of a post-conflict program. Additionally, a national
amnesty law was passed providing a “[f]ree pardon to all com-
batants for any of their actions committed in pursuit of their
objectives since March 1991.” This contentious amnesty law
was included in the Lome Peace Accords, according to some,
to promote lasting peace in Sierra Leone. The amnesty law,
however, shields combatants from prosecution of crimes
under domestic law since the war’s inception, causing pub-
lic concern that human rights abusers will enjoy immunity
for their criminal acts. 
Obligations under International Law
The amnesty law conflicts with Sierra Leone’s obligations
under humanitarian law. Under the Geneva Conventions,
Sierra Leone is obligated to punish the perpetrators of inter-
national crimes. The Special Court of Sierra Leone (Special
Court) was established in August 2000, pursuant to UN
Security Council Resolution 1315, and represented an agree-
ment between the Sierra Leonean government and the UN
to prosecute perpetrators for violating international human
rights and humanitarian law after 1996. The Special Court
statute is a bilateral agreement binding on both parties.
Both the Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 (Additional Protocol II), to which Sierra Leone
became a party on June 8, 1977, and UN Resolution 1315
impose international obligations on Sierra Leone, which
supercede the domestic amnesty law. Article 10 of the statute
of the Special Court bars amnesty protection of combatants
for international crimes defined in the statute: crimes against
humanity (Article 2); violations of Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions and of the Additional Protocol II (Arti-
cle 3); and other serious violations of international human-
itarian law (Article 4). Article 10 is grounded in international
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human rights law jurisprudence, which holds that national
amnesty laws are contrary to a state’s duty to respect and
ensure human rights. The duty to respect and ensure human
rights includes the state’s obligation to investigate, prosecute,
and punish human rights violators. Significantly, under the
Special Court statute, children between ages fifteen and eigh-
teen are neither excluded from nor protected against criminal
responsibility for violations of the international crimes in the
statute. 
Sierra Leone is now in a transitional justice phase in
which the prosecution of war criminals is essential to end
impunity and strengthen the rule of law. Establishing the
accountability of child combatants for violations of inter-
national law where their very participation in the hostilities
is a product of illegal recruitment poses a unique challenge. 
Children in the Conflict
Forced Recruitment
Both the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF
engaged in recruitment of child soldiers as young as ten years
old, which is a violation of domestic law and international
humanitarian law. Under domestic law, the minimum age for
voluntary recruitment is eighteen years. International human-
itarian law, through the Additional Protocol II, establishes
fifteen as the minimum age requirement for recruitment or
participation in hostilities. Recruitment under international
law includes conscription (compulsory recruitment), vol-
untary enlistment, and forced recruitment. Participation in
hostilities includes direct participation in combat and active
participation linked to combat such as spying, acting as
couriers, and sabotage. Finally, Article 22(2) of the African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, which
entered into force in November 1999, and to which Sierra
Leone is a signatory, requires “state parties . . . [to] take all
necessary measures to ensure that no child [below age eigh-
teen] shall take direct part in hostilities and [to] refrain in
particular from recruiting any child.”
Many international human rights groups have documented
the RUF’s systematic practice of forcibly abducting children,
and issuing death threats to recruit child soldiers in Sierra
Leone. For example, after an RUF attack and temporary
occupation of the capital city of Freetown in January 1999,
4,800 children were reported missing and 7,335 people were
reported dead. The abducted children were forced to become
soldiers, sex slaves, or work in the diamond fields, and were
routinely exploited as human shields for the rebels. AI has
reported that the RUF killed children who refused to join them
or forced them to use drugs to induce their compliance. Per-
sonal accounts from demobilized child combatants now under-
going rehabilitation recount tales of sexual violence and phys-
ical abuse. Others claim that they were threatened into aiding
and abetting in the rape of girls.
Crimes Committed by Child Soldiers
Under physical and psychological duress, child combat-
ants committed widespread and systematic atrocities con-
demned under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
(Common Article 3), Additional Protocol II, and the Special
Court statute. Children were drugged, threatened with
death, sexually and physically abused by their abductors,
and terrorized into adopting the RUF’s practice of com-
mitting war crimes. “When I go to battle fields, I smoke
enough. That’s why I become unafraid of everything,” a
child combatant interviewed by AI stated. “When you refuse
to take drugs, it’s called technical sabotage and you are
killed.” Widespread and indiscriminate murder, rape, and
amputation of limbs were signature crimes of the RUF and
are well documented by international human rights groups
such as AI and Human Rights Watch (HRW). The wide-
spread and systematic nature of the abuses committed by RUF
forces, including child combatants, fits the definition of
crimes against humanity. 
Crimes against humanity established in international cus-
tomary law primarily consist of murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, per-
secutions on political, racial, or religious grounds and other
inhumane acts committed as part of a widespread or sys-
tematic attack against a civilian population. In particular,
international customary law automatically binds all states to
prevent and punish these abuses. The statute of the Special
Court adopts the international definition of crimes against
humanity, and Article 2 of the statute of the Special Court gives
the Court the power to prosecute persons who committed
such crimes. According to this definition, RUF combatants,
including children, may be held individually criminally
responsible for committing crimes against humanity. 
Article 3 of the Special Court statute also incorporates vio-
lations of Common Article 3, the Additional Protocol II,
and other international humanitarian law violations into
the list of punishable crimes. These include: violence to
life, health, and physical or mental well-being of persons; acts
of terrorism; outrages upon personal dignity; rape, pillage,
threats to commit these acts; and intentionally directing
attacks against civilian populations or against individual
civilians not participating in the hostilities. Under these def-
initions, child combatants who committed such crimes may
face criminal accountability. 
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Information session on Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission for ex-combatants at a disarmament camp.
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Mechanisms of Accountability: Establishing the Criminal
Responsibility of Children
The Special Court of Sierra Leone
The Special Court of Sierra Leone was created to prosecute
individual perpetrators for violating international law dur-
ing the armed conflict. The temporal jurisdiction of the Spe-
cial Court, however, dates only from 1996, leaving perpetra-
tors of war crimes committed prior to 1996 unaccountable
under the Special Court jurisdiction or domestic law juris-
diction. According to Article 1 of the Special Court statute, the
goal is “to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsi-
bility for serious violations of international humanitarian law
and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra
Leone.” According to a report by the UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan on the establishment of the Special Court, the
“authority position of the accused” and the “gravity or massive
scale of the crime” are indicators of “greatest responsibility”
for purposes of prosecution under the statute. 
These factors imply that children between ages fifteen and
eighteen are not likely to be targets of prosecution by the Spe-
cial Court because of their junior status in the RUF command
structure. The UN Secretary-General, however, reported
that children who held positions of authority, such as
brigadier, and who committed gross violations under the
statute are not necessarily excluded from prosecution. At the
same time, the UN Secretary-General recognized the violent
circumstances under which children are recruited into bat-
tle, stating, “[t]hough feared by many for their brutality, most
if not all of these children have been subjected to a process
of psychological and physical abuse and duress which has
transformed them from victims into perpetrators.” Thus,
the potential prosecution of children for war crimes presents
a moral problem. 
International human rights organizations have stated
their objections to judicial accountability of children younger
than eighteen on the grounds that prosecution would place
their rehabilitation at risk. HRW recommended that the
Special Court focus on adult offenders rather than prose-
cution of children younger than eighteen in light of the chil-
dren’s inherent immaturity and forced abduction into the
armed conflict.
In the event that juvenile offenders are prosecuted, the
statute calls for special protection mechanisms for juveniles.
Article 7 of the statute states that children between the ages
of fifteen and eighteen shall be treated in accordance with
international human rights standards specific to the rights
of the child, and “[s]hall be treated with dignity and a sense
of worth, taking into account his or her young age and the
desirability of promoting his or her rehabilitation, reinte-
gration into and assumption of a constructive role in society.”
Instead of ordering imprisonment as a penalty, the Special
Court is limited to ordering any of the following rehabilita-
tive measures: care, guidance, and supervision orders; com-
munity service orders; counseling; foster care; correctional,
educational, and vocational training programs; approved
schools; and, as appropriate, any disarmament, demobi-
lization, and reintegration programs of child protection
agencies. Other protective measures include: ordering the
release of the accused, whenever possible; establishing a
juvenile chamber; providing a separate trial for a juvenile
from an adult; and providing all legal and other assistance
to ensure the juvenile’s privacy. In order to ensure that
these rights are afforded to the child-defendant, the judges
and the staff of the prosecutor’s office are expected to have
prior experience in juvenile justice.
Determining whether a child may be prosecuted for
crimes in the statute depends on the prosecutor’s consid-
eration of several factors, such as whether the child’s status
of authority and the nature of the crimes committed fulfills
the “greatest responsibility” requirement in the statute.
Another factor the prosecutor must consider is codified in
Article 15 of the statute, which states that “[i]n the prose-
cution of juvenile offenders, the Prosecutor shall ensure
that the child-rehabilitation program is not placed at risk, and
that, where appropriate, resort should be had to alternative
truth and reconciliation mechanisms, to the extent of their
availability.” In a series of communications, the UN Secretary-
General and the president of the Security Council, Sergey
Lavrov, expressed the importance of limited prosecution
of juvenile offenders, pointing to the Truth and Reconcili-
ation Commission (TRC) as an alternative to prosecution of
juveniles in order to promote the child’s rehabilitation and
social reintegration. 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Pursuant to the Lome Peace Accords, the TRC was estab-
lished in February 2000 by an agreement between the Sierra
Leonean government and the UN. The TRC’s underlying
objective is to foster national reconciliation by allowing victims
and perpetrators to tell their personal stories of their roles in
the hostilities. “Truth is a prerequisite to genuine reconcilia-
tion . . . revealing the truth leads to the addressing of impunity,”
stated Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji of the UN Mission in
Sierra Leone, the human rights observer mission tasked with
reporting human rights developments in the country. Unlike
the Special Court, the TRC does not have a punitive, prose-
cutorial role, but rather allows perpetrators and victims of
human rights violations to come forward and account for
their actions in the spirit of promoting national peace and rec-
onciliation. All those who were involved in the hostilities will
be eligible to participate in the TRC. 
The primary objective of the TRC will be to create an
impartial historical record of human rights violations com-
mitted during the armed conflict in Sierra Leone. The TRC
will investigate and report on the causes, nature, and extent
of the violations, and work to restore the human dignity of
victims and promote reconciliation through truth telling. The
TRC envisions special procedures to address child victims and
perpetrators. Accordingly, the TRC may serve as an effective
alternative to the prosecution of juvenile offenders whose
criminal responsibility is minimal or difficult to assess. Finally,
the TRC will issue a final report based on its findings and pre-
sent its recommendations to the government of Sierra Leone,
suggesting reforms needed to achieve the non-repetition
of the violations, addressing impunity, and promoting heal-
ing and reconciliation. 
Human rights groups support recording child perpetra-
tors’ accounts through the TRC as opposed to criminal pros-
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ecution because the TRC fosters the children’s total reha-
bilitation and social reintegration in accordance with Sierra
Leone’s obligation to “take all appropriate measures to pro-
mote physical and psychological recovery and social reinte-
gration of a child victim of . . . armed conflict,” according
to Article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC). The child combatant’s unique position of first victim
and then victimizer requires a special accountability mech-
anism such as the TRC. Such an approach also is consistent
with Article 40.3 of the CRC, which emphasizes the impor-
tance of using alternatives to judicial proceedings when
dealing with children who have violated the law, provided that
human rights and legal safeguards are respected. 
In pursuing the difficult task of determining the account-
ability of a child combatant, many experts argue that account-
ability would best be established through a non-punitive truth
telling process, a form of catharsis allowing the victim and
perpetrator to heal emotionally and psychologically. Experts
argue also that it would be unfair to hold children to the same
standards of criminal liability as adults who orchestrated armed
attacks and forced abductions of children. As such, truth
telling before the TRC complies with international human
rights standards in the CRC, and appears to be the most effec-
tive accountability mechanism for children.
Conclusion
The moral dilemma of holding juvenile offenders account-
able for war crimes is addressed collaboratively by the Spe-
cial Court and the TRC. The Special Court focuses on pros-
ecuting war criminals with the greatest responsibility, while
the TRC focuses on fostering national peace and reconcili-
ation. There is strong support from Sierra Leone for the pros-
ecution of juvenile offenders in order to comply with the
international obligation to punish perpetrators of human
rights and humanitarian law violations. The lack of prose-
cution, some argue, could perpetuate impunity and pose a
risk of similar abuses recurring in the future. In light of the
special circumstances of the forcibly recruited child soldier,
however, it appears that the RUF adult leaders primarily
qualify as “individuals with the greatest responsibility,” and
should therefore be targeted for prosecution. The unique
position of the child combatant, first victim then perpetra-
tor, would best be served by truth telling before the TRC to
facilitate effective social rehabilitation and reintegration.
At the same time, the TRC promotes national reconciliation,
which is essential for the population to heal after nine years
of armed conflict. 
* Ismene Zarifis is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.
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the Committee raised concerns about hydroelectric and
other development projects that might affect the way of life
and the rights of persons belonging to the Mapuche and
other indigenous communities, and concluded that “relo-
cation and compensation may not be appropriate in order
to comply with article 27 of the Covenant,” and that “when
planning actions that affect members of indigenous com-
munities, the State party must pay primary attention to the
sustainability of the indigenous culture and way of life and
to the participation of members of indigenous communi-
ties in decisions that affect them.”
Conclusion
It is questionable whether an overemphasis on the draft-
ing history of the Genocide Convention serves the Con-
vention’s purpose to protect the right to existence of minor-
ity groups. When interpreting genocide, should one be
guided by the realization that international law is not static,
but an evolving body of standards and directives that must
be interpreted and applied in a contemporaneous fashion?
Despite the encouragement engendered by the emerging
genocide approach toward development-induced displace-
ment, however, one must certainly be careful not to stretch
the law to make it fit one’s vision. Hence, the crucial ques-
tion to be answered is whether the concept of genocide is
adequate to deal with forced relocations in the context of
development projects that result in both the physical and cul-
tural extinction of an ethnic and racial minority and indige-
nous group. The concept of genocide is not quite adequate
to deal with the destructive consequences of development-
induced displacement of minority communities. In most
cases, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that
forced dislocations in the context of a development project,
including those leading to the physical or cultural destruc-
tion of a minority group, constitute genocide within the
meaning of the Genocide Convention. 
The case law of the international criminal tribunals does
not support the application of the concept of genocide to
development-induced displacement either. The factual sit-
uations the tribunals have dealt with were fundamentally dif-
ferent from most cases of forced relocations in the context
of development projects. In the cases before the tribunals,
states and individuals accused of having committed the
crime of genocide set out to exterminate the members of the
particular victim groups simply on the grounds of their eth-
nic difference. Yet to prove that a government intentionally
uses development-induced displacement as a means to extin-
guish a minority group qua group will be a difficult, if not
impossible, endeavor. Whether forced relocations in the
context of development projects are referred to as a “soft
form” or “special category” of genocide, the apparently
insurmountable hurdle of establishing the elements of geno-
cide remains. One may argue that in cases in which an indi-
vidual is held liable for the tort of genocide and not the crime,
that in these cases the intent requirement might be less
stringent. With regard to protection against cultural geno-
cide or ethnocide, it remains to be seen whether the pro-
posed declarations by the UN and the OAS on Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights, once adopted, will be used as standards
against which the practice of ethnically targeted development
in general, and of development-induced displacement of
minority communities in particular, are measured. 
* Stefanie Ricarda Roos, M.A.L.D. (Tufts University), is a visit-
ing research scholar at the Washington College of Law and a
Ph.D. candidate in international law/international human rights
law at the Faculty of Law at Bonn University in Germany. This
piece is part of an ongoing research project. The author may be con-
tacted at ricardaroos@hotmail.com.
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